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A Level H2 History Practice Paper 2
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A-Level History H2 - Practice Paper
Source Based Skills
Subject: History H2 (9174) Level: A-Level Paper: Practice Paper 2 (Source Based Skills) Duration: 1 hour 30 minutes Total Marks: 50 Paper Type: PRACTICE Version: 2 of 5
Name: _________________________ Class: _________________________ Date: _________________________
Instructions to Candidates
- This paper consists of TWO sections.
- Answer ALL questions in both sections.
- Write your answers in the spaces provided.
- The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question.
- You are reminded of the need for good English and clear presentation in your answers.
- You should spend approximately 15 minutes reading the sources before beginning your answers.
SECTION A: Source Analysis Skills (30 marks)
Study Sources A–D and answer Questions 1–4.
Source A: Extract from a speech by the Malaysian Foreign Minister at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, July 1995, regarding the South China Sea dispute.
"ASEAN has demonstrated remarkable unity in addressing the South China Sea issue. Our collective approach through the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea has established a framework for peaceful resolution. We have consistently urged all parties to exercise restraint and resolve differences through dialogue. The progress we have made in developing a regional Code of Conduct demonstrates ASEAN's commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the region. While challenges remain, ASEAN's diplomatic efforts have prevented escalation and kept channels of communication open."
Source B: Extract from an academic article by Professor James Chen, "ASEAN and Maritime Disputes: A Critical Assessment," published in the Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.
"The ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea of 1992 represented a diplomatic achievement in principle, but its practical impact has been negligible. Member states have consistently prioritised bilateral relations with China over ASEAN solidarity. The failure to establish a binding Code of Conduct after more than a decade of negotiations reveals the fundamental weakness of ASEAN's consensus-based approach. Individual member states, particularly those with direct territorial claims, have pursued their own interests, undermining collective action. ASEAN's much-vaunted 'ASEAN Way' of non-interference and quiet diplomacy has proven inadequate for resolving hard security disputes."
Source C: Cartoon published in The Bangkok Post, 1998, depicting ASEAN leaders as small figures attempting to hold back a large dragon labelled "China" with a flimsy rope labelled "ASEAN Declaration."
[Visual description: The cartoon shows several small figures wearing suits with ASEAN country flags on their lapels, pulling on a thin rope attached to a large, imposing dragon. The dragon appears unconcerned. In the background, there are islands with multiple flags planted on them. A speech bubble from one ASEAN figure reads: "We must maintain consensus!"]
Source D: Extract from a joint statement by the ASEAN-China Summit, November 2002, announcing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).
"The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognised principles of international law which shall serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations. The Parties undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned."
Question 1
Compare and contrast the evidence provided by Sources A and B on ASEAN's effectiveness in managing the South China Sea dispute. [10 marks]
Question 2
How useful is Source C as evidence for understanding ASEAN's role in the South China Sea dispute? Explain your answer. [8 marks]
Question 3
How reliable is Source D as evidence for ASEAN's ability to resolve the South China Sea dispute? Explain your answer. [6 marks]
Question 4
Study all the sources.
How far do Sources A–D support the view that ASEAN's efforts in the South China Sea dispute have been a failure? Use all the sources in your answer. [6 marks]
SECTION B: Source Evaluation and Synthesis (20 marks)
Study Sources E–H and answer Questions 5–6.
Source E: Extract from a United Nations report on peacekeeping operations, 1995, reflecting on UN involvement in the Congo crisis (1960–1964).
"The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) represented the most complex peacekeeping mission undertaken by the organisation to date. The Security Council's mandate evolved from ensuring the withdrawal of Belgian forces to preventing civil war and maintaining territorial integrity. However, the mission exposed fundamental tensions within the UN system. The Secretary-General's interpretation of the mandate was contested by several member states, and the use of force to prevent secession in Katanga raised questions about the boundaries between peacekeeping and enforcement. The Soviet Union's refusal to pay its assessed contributions for ONUC nearly bankrupted the organisation and led to a constitutional crisis."
Source F: Extract from a memoir by a former US State Department official, published 1980, discussing UN peacekeeping during the Cold War.
"The United States consistently supported UN peacekeeping as a tool for containing conflicts that might otherwise draw in the superpowers. However, we recognised that the Security Council veto constrained what could be achieved. The Soviets viewed peacekeeping with suspicion, seeing it as a Western tool for intervention. The result was that peacekeeping missions could only be deployed where both superpowers agreed—a rare occurrence. The UN's inability to act in Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, or Afghanistan demonstrated the limits of collective security when great power interests were directly engaged. Peacekeeping worked best in peripheral conflicts where neither superpower had vital interests at stake."
Source G: Statistical data on UN peacekeeping operations, 1948–2000.
| Period | Number of Missions | Successful Mandate Completion | Partial Success | Failure |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1948–1955 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 1956–1970 | 10 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| 1971–1987 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 1988–2000 | 38 | 25 | 9 | 4 |
Source H: Extract from a speech by the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly, 1992, "An Agenda for Peace."
"The end of the Cold War has opened new possibilities for the United Nations to fulfil the promise of the Charter. The organisation is now able to act with greater unity of purpose. Peacekeeping has evolved from traditional ceasefire monitoring to complex multidimensional operations involving electoral assistance, human rights monitoring, and nation-building. However, we must be realistic about what the UN can achieve. Peacekeeping is not a substitute for political will. The international community must provide the resources and sustained commitment necessary for success. The failures in Somalia and Bosnia remind us that peacekeeping without a peace to keep is a dangerous undertaking."
Question 5
Study Sources E and F.
Compare and contrast the evidence provided by these sources on the constraints facing UN peacekeeping during the Cold War. [10 marks]
Question 6
Study all the sources.
"United Nations peacekeeping efforts were largely undermined by the principle of collective security between 1945 and 1990."
Using Sources E–H, assess how far the evidence supports this claim. [10 marks]
END OF PAPER
This is a TuitionGoWhere AI-generated practice paper. Version 2 of 5.
Answers
A-Level History H2 - Practice Paper Answer Key
Source Based Skills
Version 2 of 5
Subject: History H2 (9174) Level: A-Level Paper: Practice Paper 2 (Source Based Skills) Total Marks: 50
SECTION A: Source Analysis Skills (30 marks)
Question 1: Compare and Contrast Sources A and B [10 marks]
Marking Scheme:
| Level | Marks | Descriptor |
|---|---|---|
| L4 | 9–10 | Sophisticated comparison identifying multiple points of agreement and disagreement, with evaluation of source nature and context |
| L3 | 7–8 | Clear comparison with specific points of agreement and disagreement, some reference to source provenance |
| L2 | 4–6 | Some comparison but may be imbalanced or descriptive, limited use of source details |
| L1 | 1–3 | General statements, little specific comparison, may summarise sources separately |
Model Answer Framework:
Points of Agreement:
- Both sources acknowledge ASEAN's diplomatic engagement with the South China Sea issue
- Both recognise the 1992 ASEAN Declaration as a significant initiative
- Both acknowledge that challenges remain in resolving the dispute
- Both imply that ASEAN's approach involves peaceful, diplomatic methods
Points of Disagreement:
- Source A presents ASEAN's efforts as effective ("remarkable unity," "prevented escalation"), while Source B characterises them as inadequate ("negligible" practical impact, "fundamental weakness")
- Source A emphasises progress ("developing a regional Code of Conduct"), while Source B emphasises failure ("failure to establish a binding Code of Conduct after more than a decade")
- Source A portrays ASEAN solidarity positively, while Source B argues member states prioritise bilateral relations over collective action
- Source A presents the "ASEAN Way" as a strength, while Source B presents it as a weakness ("proven inadequate")
Source Evaluation:
- Source A: Official government speech (1995) – likely to present ASEAN positively, may reflect diplomatic optimism rather than objective assessment
- Source B: Academic article (2005) – written with hindsight, more critical perspective, benefits from observing outcomes over a longer period
- The 10-year gap between sources is significant: Source A reflects mid-process optimism; Source B reflects later assessment of limited progress
Synthesis: Both sources agree on ASEAN's diplomatic engagement, but they fundamentally disagree on its effectiveness. Source A's official perspective emphasises process and intent, while Source B's academic perspective evaluates outcomes. The contrast reflects different vantage points: a participant in ongoing diplomacy versus an analyst assessing results retrospectively.
Question 2: Usefulness of Source C [8 marks]
Marking Scheme:
| Level | Marks | Descriptor |
|---|---|---|
| L4 | 7–8 | Sophisticated assessment of usefulness considering source type, context, and limitations, with clear link to historical question |
| L3 | 5–6 | Clear assessment of usefulness with reference to source details and some evaluation of limitations |
| L2 | 3–4 | Some assessment but may be general or one-sided, limited evaluation |
| L1 | 1–2 | Basic statements about usefulness, little specific analysis |
Model Answer Framework:
What Source C provides (Usefulness):
- Captures contemporary perception (1998) that ASEAN was weak relative to China in the dispute
- The cartoon format effectively conveys the power imbalance between ASEAN and China
- The visual metaphor of the "flimsy rope" suggests ASEAN's diplomatic tools were seen as inadequate
- The speech bubble "We must maintain consensus!" highlights the perceived constraint of ASEAN's decision-making process
- Provides evidence of regional media scepticism about ASEAN's effectiveness
- Useful for understanding how ASEAN's efforts were perceived by contemporary observers in Southeast Asia
Limitations:
- As a cartoon, it is an opinion piece reflecting the cartoonist's perspective, not objective evidence
- Published in Thailand, which has direct territorial claims – may reflect national frustration rather than balanced assessment
- The cartoon simplifies a complex diplomatic situation for satirical effect
- Cannot provide factual detail about specific ASEAN actions or outcomes
- Represents one moment in time (1998) – does not capture later developments such as the 2002 DOC
Overall Assessment: Source C is useful for understanding contemporary perceptions of ASEAN's weakness in the South China Sea dispute, particularly the view that ASEAN's consensus-based approach was inadequate against Chinese power. However, as a satirical cartoon, it must be used cautiously as evidence of actual outcomes rather than perceptions. It is most useful when corroborated with other sources that provide factual evidence of ASEAN's effectiveness or lack thereof.
Question 3: Reliability of Source D [6 marks]
Marking Scheme:
| Level | Marks | Descriptor |
|---|---|---|
| L3 | 5–6 | Sophisticated evaluation of reliability considering provenance, context, and purpose, with balanced conclusion |
| L2 | 3–4 | Clear evaluation with some reference to source details and context |
| L1 | 1–2 | Basic statements about reliability, limited analysis |
Model Answer Framework:
Factors supporting reliability:
- Official joint statement by ASEAN and China (2002) – represents agreed positions of all parties
- References established international law (UN Charter, UNCLOS, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation) – grounds commitments in recognised frameworks
- Public document subject to international scrutiny – parties have reputational stake in appearing committed
- Specific commitments to peaceful resolution and non-use of force are verifiable against subsequent behaviour
Factors limiting reliability:
- As a diplomatic declaration, it records aspirations and commitments, not necessarily actual intentions or capabilities
- The phrase "by sovereign states directly concerned" may allow bilateral approaches that bypass ASEAN collectively
- The DOC is non-binding – parties may sign without genuine commitment to implementation
- China's subsequent behaviour (island building, militarisation post-2002) suggests the declaration did not reliably indicate future actions
- Joint statements may paper over disagreements to present a united front
Overall Assessment: Source D is reliable as evidence of what ASEAN and China were willing to commit to publicly in 2002, and it accurately records the diplomatic language and frameworks invoked. However, it is less reliable as evidence of ASEAN's actual ability to resolve the dispute, as the non-binding nature of the declaration and subsequent events suggest the commitments did not translate into effective dispute resolution. The source must be evaluated against outcomes to assess its reliability as evidence of ASEAN's effectiveness.
Question 4: How far do Sources A–D support the view that ASEAN's efforts have been a failure? [6 marks]
Marking Scheme:
| Level | Marks | Descriptor |
|---|---|---|
| L3 | 5–6 | Balanced synthesis using all sources, clear evaluation of support for the claim, nuanced conclusion |
| L2 | 3–4 | Uses most sources with some synthesis, may be imbalanced in treatment |
| L1 | 1–2 | Limited use of sources, general statements, weak synthesis |
Model Answer Framework:
Sources supporting the "failure" view:
- Source B (academic article): Explicitly argues ASEAN's practical impact has been "negligible," consensus approach "inadequate," and failure to establish binding Code of Conduct reveals "fundamental weakness"
- Source C (cartoon): Visually depicts ASEAN as powerless against China, suggesting diplomatic tools are ineffective
- Source D (partially): The non-binding nature of the DOC and subsequent Chinese actions suggest limited effectiveness
Sources challenging the "failure" view:
- Source A (Malaysian FM speech): Presents ASEAN's efforts as successful in preventing escalation, maintaining dialogue, and establishing diplomatic frameworks
- Source D (partially): Demonstrates ASEAN achieved a formal declaration with China, representing diplomatic progress and commitment to peaceful resolution
Synthesis and Conclusion: The sources provide mixed support for the "failure" view. Source B and C strongly support it, while Source A directly challenges it. Source D provides evidence that can be interpreted either way. Overall, the sources suggest ASEAN's efforts have had some diplomatic success in establishing frameworks for dialogue (supported by A and D), but have been less successful in achieving binding resolutions or constraining unilateral actions (supported by B and C). The view that ASEAN's efforts have been a "failure" is partially supported, but the sources also indicate that ASEAN has achieved some diplomatic outcomes, suggesting "limited success" may be a more accurate characterisation than outright "failure."
SECTION B: Source Evaluation and Synthesis (20 marks)
Question 5: Compare and Contrast Sources E and F [10 marks]
Marking Scheme:
| Level | Marks | Descriptor |
|---|---|---|
| L4 | 9–10 | Sophisticated comparison identifying multiple points of agreement and disagreement, with evaluation of source nature and context |
| L3 | 7–8 | Clear comparison with specific points of agreement and disagreement, some reference to source provenance |
| L2 | 4–6 | Some comparison but may be imbalanced or descriptive, limited use of source details |
| L1 | 1–3 | General statements, little specific comparison, may summarise sources separately |
Model Answer Framework:
Points of Agreement:
- Both sources identify the Security Council veto and great power politics as constraints on UN peacekeeping
- Both acknowledge that superpower disagreement limited where peacekeeping could be deployed
- Both recognise that peacekeeping was most effective where superpower interests were not directly engaged
- Both identify the Cold War context as fundamentally shaping UN peacekeeping capabilities
- Both acknowledge that peacekeeping mandates could be contested and ambiguous
Points of Disagreement:
- Source E focuses on institutional and constitutional constraints within the UN (mandate interpretation, funding crises), while Source F emphasises geopolitical constraints (superpower rivalry, veto use)
- Source E uses the Congo as a specific case study of operational challenges, while Source F provides a broader strategic overview
- Source E highlights the Secretary-General's role and institutional tensions, while Source F focuses on state actors (US and Soviet perspectives)
- Source E presents the funding crisis as a significant constraint, while Source F does not address resource issues
Source Evaluation:
- Source E: UN official report (1995) – institutional perspective, may emphasise systemic and organisational factors, written with post-Cold War hindsight
- Source F: Former US official's memoir (1980) – national perspective, may reflect US strategic interests and justify US policy, written during the Cold War
- The different dates are significant: Source F reflects Cold War-era thinking, while Source E benefits from post-Cold War perspective
Synthesis: Both sources agree that Cold War great power politics constrained UN peacekeeping, but they emphasise different dimensions of this constraint. Source E highlights institutional and operational challenges, while Source F emphasises strategic and geopolitical factors. Together, they provide a more complete picture: peacekeeping was constrained both by superpower rivalry (Source F) and by the institutional weaknesses this rivalry created within the UN system (Source E).
Question 6: Assess Sources E–H on the claim about collective security undermining peacekeeping [10 marks]
Marking Scheme:
| Level | Marks | Descriptor |
|---|---|---|
| L4 | 9–10 | Sophisticated synthesis using all sources, clear evaluation of the claim, balanced and nuanced conclusion, excellent source evaluation |
| L3 | 7–8 | Clear synthesis using most sources, good evaluation of the claim, some source evaluation |
| L2 | 4–6 | Uses some sources, may be imbalanced, limited synthesis or evaluation |
| L1 | 1–3 | Limited use of sources, general statements, weak synthesis |
Model Answer Framework:
Understanding the claim: The claim asserts that the principle of collective security (requiring great power consensus for enforcement action under the UN Charter) was the primary factor undermining UN peacekeeping effectiveness during the Cold War (1945–1990).
Sources supporting the claim:
- Source E: The Congo case demonstrates how Security Council mandate interpretation was contested, and the Soviet refusal to pay contributions nearly "bankrupted the organisation" – showing how collective security requirements created operational paralysis
- Source F: Explicitly states that the "Security Council veto constrained what could be achieved" and that peacekeeping "could only be deployed where both superpowers agreed – a rare occurrence" – directly supporting the claim
- Source G (partially): The low number of missions during 1971–1987 (only 3) compared to post-Cold War (38 from 1988–2000) suggests Cold War constraints significantly limited peacekeeping activity
Sources challenging or qualifying the claim:
- Source E (partially): Also identifies other constraints beyond collective security – mandate ambiguity, funding mechanisms, the challenge of distinguishing peacekeeping from enforcement
- Source G: Shows that even during the Cold War, some missions achieved success (4 of 10 completed successfully in 1956–1970), suggesting collective security did not "largely undermine" all efforts
- Source H: The post-Cold War perspective reveals that even without collective security constraints, peacekeeping faced other challenges – "peacekeeping without a peace to keep" in Somalia and Bosnia, resource constraints, and the need for "political will"
- Source H implies that removing the collective security constraint did not automatically make peacekeeping effective – other factors remained crucial
Synthesis and Conclusion: The sources provide substantial but not complete support for the claim. Sources E and F strongly support the view that collective security requirements (particularly the veto) constrained peacekeeping during the Cold War. Source G's data shows a dramatic increase in missions after the Cold War, supporting the inference that collective security was a significant constraint.
However, the sources also indicate that collective security was not the only factor. Source E reveals operational and institutional challenges, while Source H demonstrates that even after the collective security constraint was reduced, peacekeeping faced other significant obstacles. The claim that peacekeeping was "largely undermined" by collective security is supported to the extent that collective security was a major constraint, but the sources suggest it was one of several factors, and its removal did not guarantee peacekeeping success.
Overall, the evidence supports a qualified version of the claim: collective security was a significant constraint on UN peacekeeping during the Cold War, but other factors (mandate clarity, resources, political will) were also important, and these other factors continued to affect peacekeeping even after the collective security constraint diminished.
Marking Notes:
- For all source-based questions, credit should be given for effective use of source details and evaluation of provenance
- Answers that demonstrate synthesis across sources should be rewarded at higher levels
- For Question 4 and Question 6, balanced evaluation that acknowledges both supporting and challenging evidence should be rewarded
- Quality of written communication should be considered in borderline cases
This answer key corresponds to TuitionGoWhere Practice Paper Version 2 of 5.